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TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
AND THE LESSER RESTRICTIVE
ALTERNATIVE DOCTRINE
A parent has almost complete authority to control every aspect of
his child's life. This parental right of control has been primarily justi-
fied under two theories. Under the earlier of the two, parents were
understood to have inherent rights in their children similar to those in
property.1 A similar degree of control is justified under the more
modem idea that maintaining the control of natural parents is usually
in the best interest of a child.2
Despite its pervasiveness under normal conditions, almost every
state has statutes under which parental rights may be terminated.
Basically these statutes interrupt the parental right under four different
conditions: (1) divorce proceedings, 4 (2) guardianship proceedings,
(3) adoption proceedings6 and (4) when the child's natural parents
1. See, e.g., Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 152 P.2d 999 (1944). See generally
Bronson, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 332, 335 (1922); note 10 infra.
2. See, e.g., Stout v. Stout, 166 Kan. 459, 464, 281 P.2d 637, 641 (1944); Ross
v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 86 A.2d 463 (1952).
3. A.AszA STAT. § 47.10.080 (1975); Amz. REv. STAT. § 8-538 (1974); CAL. Civ.
CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1976); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-4-101 (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-43a (West Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.11(1)(d) (West Supp.
1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-3201 (1976); HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-61 (Supp. 1975);
IDAHO CODE § 16-2005 (Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-9(z) (Smith-
Hurd 1972); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-7 (Bums Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE ANN. §
600A.8 (West Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. § 38-824(c) (Supp. 1976); Ky. Rev. STAT.
§ 199.600 (Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3793 (1964); MIcH. CoMP. LAws
ANN. § 712A.19a (West Supp. 1976-77); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.221 (West Supp.
1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211-441 (Vernon 1959); MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 10-
1314 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-209 (Supp. 1976); NEv. REv. STAT. § 128.105
(1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-20 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-23 (Supp.
1975); N.Y. JuD. LAw § 634 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
288 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44 (1974); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.353
(D) (1971); OxxA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130 (Supp. 1976); OR. REv. STAT. § 419.523
(1975); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 15-7-7 (Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE § 15-1095-36 (Supp. 1974);
T!ENN. CODE ANN. § 36-110 (Supp. 1976); TEmx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 15.02 (Ver-
non Supp. 1976-77); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-109 (1953); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-
5(3) (1976); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 48.40 (West 1957 & Supp. 1976-77); Wyo. STAT.
§ 14.57 (1965).
4. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4351 (West Supp. 1975).
5. E.g., CAL. PRoB. CODE § 1405 (West Supp. 1975).
6. CAL. Civ. CODE § 229 (West 1954).
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TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS
have neglected or abused him.7  Even though interruption of the right
in the last situation is instigated as well as enforced by the state, courts
in neglect proceedings are seldom required to frame their orders more
narrowly or exercise greater restraint than courts acting in the first
three situations."
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution seems
to mandate restraint on the part of the state when the parental right is
terminated in neglect proceedings unless the state's interests could be
vindicated in no other way. In order to determine whether present
state laws permitting termination of the parental right in neglected
children are unconstitutional, this article will first examine neglect stat-
utes and the termination process under such statutes and, secondly, the
constitutional rights that those statutes may impinge. Finally, the
article will suggest ways in which any constitutional infirmities can
be cured.
NEGLECT AND ABUSE STATUTES
The state derives the authority to interfere with the parental right
from two sources: the police power and parens patriae power. Under
the parens patriae power, a state is entitled to insure the well-being
of individual citizens.9 In the case of children who are incapable of
protecting themselves, this justification for state action is particularly
persuasive. Thus, under a parens patriae rationale, a state justifies re-
ducing a parent's control over his child in order to insure the welfare
of that child.10 The theory supports not only taking the child from the
7. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 600 (West 1972). See Bodenheimer, The Multi-
plicity of Child Custody Proceedings-Problems of California Law, 23 STAN. L. REv.
703, 706-21 (1971), for a discussion of the jurisdictional conflicts and procedural com-
plexities created by the four separate bases for termination in California.
8. See text accompanying notes 9-44 infra.
9. See Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890); Hammon v.
Hill, 228 F. 999 (W.D. Pa. 1915).
10. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (The state has the "right
and the duty to protect minor children."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944); C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 367
(1966); Note, Parens Patriae and Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE
L.J. 745, 748 (1973).
Under Roman law, the father could sell, mutilate, kill or sacrifice his children,
a prerogative thought to have been borrowed from the Greeks, who thought of children
as property of the father. In the centuries that followed, the right of the government
to interfere in a father's exercise of this right was gradually established. This interfer-
ence was primarily justified under the parens patriae doctrine. Thomas, Child Abuse
and Neglect Part 1: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50
N.C.L. REv. 293, 295-315 (1971).
The use of the parens patriae power to interfere with the parental right in order
1977]
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custody of his natural parents, but also terminating all parental rights
in the child and providing him with new parents when it is in his best
interests. Under the theory that the state acts in the best interests of
the child, the doctrine has also been felt to justify dispensing with many
procedural rights that parties to judicial proceedings otherwise have."
In contrast to the state's action in the best interests of a neglected
child, interference with the parental right can also be justified under
to protect a child is commonly traced to Falkland v. Bertie, 23 Eng. Rep. 814 (Ch.
1696), where the Court of Chancery recognized that the king could serve as the pater
patridae of every subject who was incapable of self-protection. Charities, idiots, infants
and lunatics were all included in this category. See Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep.
659, 664 (Ch. 1722). In Falkland, the court, through the king, intervened to protect
the child's interest in real property over the testamentary guardian who was trying
to claim the land as his own. Parens patriae was extended in the case of Beaufort
v. Berty, 24 Eng. Rep. 579 (Ch. 1721), which again involved a testamentary guardian
taking advantage of a minor child's property interest. In that case, the child was pro-
tected from third parties although the father was alive and able to protect the child.
The modem form of the doctrine did not take shape until Wellesley v. Beaufort, 38
Eng. Rep. 236 (1827); See also In re Spence, 41 Eng. Rep. 937 (Ch. 1847) (court
interfered with the natural father's right to his minor child when it appeared the father
was wrongfully appropriating the child's property).
Despite the extension of the parens patridae doctrine in the Court of Chancery,
courts of law in England continued to recognize the parent's right to the child as abso-
lute for some time. See De Manneville v. De Manneville, 32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch.
1804). However, Parliament extended the Chancery's power to award children under
16 to the mother. The Custody of Infants Act, 36 and 37 Vict. C. 12 (1873). See
also LEONARD, THE EARLY HISTORY OF ENGLISH POOR RELIEF (1900); Risenfeld, The
Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law; 43 CAL. L. Ray. 175 (1955). The
laws were important for -the furtherance of the industrial revolution. Through this
act the children were placed in work shops as apprentices. Apparently both English
and American courts, as well as the general public at large, supported this policy. See
Mercein v. People, 35 Am. Dec. 653 (N.Y. 1840).
American courts never felt comfortable with the English view of absolute parental
rights in the father. Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 656, 657 (1881). Accordingly,
the concept that the parental right was absolute never became firmly fixed in the courts
or the legislatures. Although the parental right was always shown deference, it was
felt a mother could take care of her child without the assistance of the father. In
several important decisions, the child was actually taken away from the father and
placed in the care of the mother. Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child:
A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J.
887, 890 (1975). A few courts took custody away from both parents, terminated their
rights, and appointed an unrelated guardian custodian of the child. See, e.g., Garner
v. Gordon, 41 Ind. 92 (1872); Dumain v. Gwynne, 92 Mass. 270 (1865) (custody
given to a charitable institution).
The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children was formed in New York
City in 1874. While the majority of the Society's efforts were aimed at eradicating
the horrible living conditions of poor children, rather than terminating parental rights,
NEW YORK SocIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, FIRST ANNUAL
REPORT 30-31 (1876), its creation reflected the changing attitude with respect to the
disciplining of children; no longer were physical beatings or captivity tolerated by the
public.
11. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which rejected this argument in
the context of a juvenile delinquency proceeding.
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the police power in order to protect society at large.12 Because a child
who has been mistreated either by his parents or the state may rebel
against the institutions that he feels cheated him, protection of society
may require that a neglected or abused child be taken from his parents
to diminish the possibility of future criminal acts.'13
Procedures for State Interference with the Parental Right
In order to determine when the interests of children and society
are in need of protection, states set standards of parental care. These
standards are vague; generally, parents are required to give their chil-
dren "necessary and proper" care.' 4  Once a state is made aware that
the care given by a parent may not fulfill these standards,' 5 the allega-
tion is investigated. 16 If it appears that the standard has been violated,
the appropriate state agency files a petition for a hearing.
7 While all
12. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) ('The objectives
are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection
for society . . . ."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944); Milwaukee
Indus. School v. Supervisors, 40 Wis. 328, 337 (1876).
13. M. KADUsHiN, Cru WELFARE SEnvrcEs (1967).
14. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1101(b), (c) (1971).
(b) The term "child" in need of supervision" means any person under
the age of eighteen (18) years who is habitually truant from school, or who
is beyond the control of his parents, guardian or other custodian, or who habit-
ually deports himself so as to injure or endanger the health or morals of him-
self or others.
(c) The term "dependent or neglected child" means any person under
the age of eighteen (18) years who is for any reason destitute, homeless or
abandoned; or who is dependent upon the public for support; or who has not
the proper parental care or guardianship; or whose home, by reason of neglect,
cruelty, or depravity on the part of his parents, guardian or other person in
whose care it may be, is an unfit place for such child; or who is in need
of special care and treatment because of his physical or mental condition,
and his parents, guardian or legal custodian is unable to provide it; or whose
parent or legal custodian for good cause desires to be relieved of his custody;
or who is without necessary care or support through no fault of his parents,
guardian or custodian. Provided, however, no child who, in good faith, is
being provided with treatment and care by spiritual means alone in accordance
with the tenets and practice of a recognized church or religious denomination
by a duly accredited practitioner thereof shall, for that reason alone, be consid-
ered to be a dependent or neglected child under any provision of this act.
15. The state somehow must be aware of some condition which potentially is in
violation of the state standard of proper parental care. Almost all states require a
physician to inform the state's social services agency of any case of child mistreatment.
See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw. § 413 (McKinney 1976). New York, like other states,
provides criminal sanctions for physicians who fail to report child abuse. N.Y. Soc.
Smwv. LAw § 420 (McKinney 1976). See also KAN. STAT. § 38-720 (Supp. 1976).'
Most statutes permit anyone to report a suspected violation. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 37, § 704-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
16. See, e.g., NEv. Rnv. STAT. § 128.040 (1975).
17. E.g., OrLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1103 (Supp. 1976); most states require a specific
form for the petition. E.g., Nav. REv. STAT. § 128.050 (1975); N.Y. JuD. LAw §9
261, 1022 (McKinney 1975) and § 614 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
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states require that the parents be notified of the hearing, few require
personal service or even the best possible notice under the circum-
stances.' 8
The Custody Hearing
The purpose of this initial hearing, which will be referred to as
the custody hearing, is to substantiate the allegations in the welfare
agency's petition,' 9 and thus either justify temporarily taking the child
from his parents' custody,20 or endorse previous interference with par-
ental custody under an emergency custody statute.2 ' Even though
every state provides for such a hearing, the procedural safeguards pro-
vided parents vary greatly from state to state.22
The appointment of counsel for parents unable to afford repre-
sentation is recognized as a statutory right in all states. 23  However,
despite the presence of counsel, custody hearings are not adversarial.24
The procedure is generally formal and the rules of evidence relaxed.25
While some states require their social welfare agency to support a cus-
tody petition by clear and convincing evidence, 6 the majority of states
only require proof by a preponderance of the evidence.27 In most
states no provision is made for a jury trial.25
18. E.g., N.Y. JuD. LAw §§ 616, 617 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1976-77). Cf.
APX. STAT. ANN. § 45-426 (Supp. 1975) (notice by publication in certain instances).
19. E.g. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 352 (1958).
20. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1137(a) (Supp. 1976) "[A] child in need
of supervision" or otherwise "dependent and neglected" or even "delinquent" may, at
the court's discretion, be removed from the parent.
21. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 1130(B), 1107(B) (1971) which provide for
immediate removal of custody if a child is in immediate danger. In light of the ex-
igency of the circumstances in these situations, generally notice is absolutely required.
N.Y. JuD. LAW §§ 1022, 1024 (McKinney 1975) and N.Y. Soc. SEv. LAw § 417
(McKinney 1976). The advisory notes here suggest that in the case of parental aban-
donment no notice may be necessary, because requiring such notice would frustrate
the act's purpose.
22. See Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1,
67 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Katz, Howe & McGrath].
23. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 37 § 701-20(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977). But see
MD. Soc. SERV. CODE ANN. Art. 27 § 35A (1976) (within the discretion of the judge).
24. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 37 § 701-20 (Supp. 1977) (characterizing custody
proceeding as non-adversarial); HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-41 (Supp. 1975).
25. E.g., In re Johnson, 214 Kan. 780, 522 P.2d 330 (1974) (admission of hearsay
evidence harmless). See generally KAN. STAT. § 38-817 (Supp. 1976). Contra, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 704-6 (Smith-Hurd 1972). See also N.Y. JuD. LAW § 624
(McKinney Supp. 1976-77) (evidence must be "material, competent and relevant").
26. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2201(c) (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-29(c)
(1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-229(c) (1977).
27. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2317(c)(2) (1973); Cotter v. Hunter, 540 P.2d 1159
(Okla. 1975) (civil burdens of proof apply in absence of statutory provision).
28. E.g., CLO. Rnv. STAT. § 19-1-106 (1973).
[Vol. 12:528
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If the welfare agency's petition is sustained and the child is tem-
porarily removed from his parents' custody, a second hearing is set in
which the parents' rights in the child are finally adjudged.29 The pe-
riod between this procedure, which will be referred to as the termina-
tion hearing, and the custody hearing varies. In some states it occurs
immediately following the custody hearing. 0 Other states provide for
a period between the two hearings in which the parents are given an
opportunity to correct the conditions found to be deficient in the cus-
tody hearing. 1 During this interim, the activities of the parents are
monitored by the welfare agency, which reports its findings for use in
the termination hearing.32
The Termination Hearing
Like the custody hearing, the termination hearing is conducted in
an informal, non-adversarial manner.3 In order to permit the fullest
disclosure of the parent-child relationship, the rules of evidence are re-
laxed.3 4 Notice must be provided to the parents,3 5 and their presence
is ostensibly a prerequisite to termination.3 6 Neither requirement may
be rigidly insisted on, however, since abandonment is a sufficient
29. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 611, 623 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77) (child must be
found to be permanently neglected).
30. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 625 (MeKinney Supp. 1976-77) (termination hearing
may occur immediately after custody hearing).
31. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130(A)(3)(c) (Supp. 1976), which allows
the parent six months to correct improper conditions.
32. E.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-1-108 (1973); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1115 (Supp.
1976). In New York, where a termination disposition is set immediately after a custody
hearing, evidence relating to the conduct of the parent after the filing of the petition
is inadmissible. N.Y. JuD. Aw § 624 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
33. See, e.g., IDAHo CODE § 16-2009 (Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 701-20
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
34. iCee Jones v. Jones, 39 Ill. App. 3d 821, 350 N.E.2d 826 (1976) (hearsay evi-
dence is admissible in a termination proceeding); N.Y. JuD. FAM. Cr. AcT § 1046(b)
(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1976-77) (only "relevant, competent and material evidence" is
admitted); In re Blaine, 54 Misc. 2d 248, 282 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Fain. Ct. 1967) (judge
has great discretion in admission of evidence).
35. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-13 (1972); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-2 (1976) (best
notice possible). New York, as most states generally, handles the problem of abandon-
ment by using every reasonable effort to contact the parents. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 1041
(McKinney 1975). See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
vacated and reversed on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). See generally Mullane
v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (best possible notice is required
for due process).
36. N.Y. Jun. LAw H§ 1041, 1042 (McKinney 1975). See also In re Ana Maria
Q., 382 N.Y.S.2d 107 (App. Div. 1976). New York permits termination despite a
parent's absence if that parent refuses to appear. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 384-b (Me-
Kinney Supp. 1976-77).
6
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ground for termination.87  While most states provide counsel for in-
digent individuals,88 in many states appointment of counsel can be
denied in the best interests of the child.39 Even though the signifi-
cance of the termination hearing is far greater than the custody hearing,
only one state requires a greater burden of proof in this hearing than
in the other.40  In fact, many states rely on presumptions which en-
courage the termination of the parents' rights in their child.41 Some
states consider the trial court's finding of termination final, if there is
no appeal taken on behalf of either the parent or the child.42
Almost every state provides for the termination of parental rights
if conditions of neglect are still present at the time of the termination
proceeding. Moreover, few states clearly permit other dispositions less
radical than a complete severence of the parent child relation.43 In-
deed, few states address the question of alternatives to termination at
all.
LESSER RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES
The due process clause requires that states pursue courses of ac-
tion which impinge on important rights as little as possible.44  This as-
pect of due process, which will be referred to as the lesser restrictive
alternatives doctrine, focuses on the means, rather than the ends, of
state action. It allows a state to achieve its legitimate goals, but re-
37. See, e.g., N.Y. Jun. LAw § 1024(b) (ii) (McKinney Supp. 1976-77) (best notice
possible). The advisory notes on this subsection suggest that where parents may be
unreachable, the state owes no further notice. See note 37 supra.
38. E.g., MimN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(2) (1971). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967). Contra, ALAS. STAT. § 47.10.010-47.142 (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. H9 8-531
to 8-544 (1973). See also n.23 supra.
39. E.g., Nv. REV. STAT. § 128.100 (1975) (permissive appointment of counsel).
40. New York is perhaps the only state which increases the state's burden. Even
so, this happens only where the cause for termination is mental illness. At that point,
the burden shifts to clear and convincing proof rather than the normal civil standard
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 1046(b) (i) (Mc-
Kinney 1975); N.Y. Soc. SEav. LAw § 384-b(4)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
Furthermore, Professor Tribe suggests that the only standard consistent with protection
of neglected and abused children is the preponderance standard. Tribe, 39 LAw &
CoNmTm. PROB. 8, 11, 23 (Summer 1975).
41. E.g., NEv. Ruv. STAT. § 128.095 (1975) (putative father presumed to have
abandoned his child unless he makes an affirmative effort to appear at the termination
proceeding); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.605 (Supp. 1976) (multiple illegitimate children
prima facie evidence that parent is unfit).
42. E.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-3-1115(b) (1973).
43. But see OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1137 (Supp. 1976). E.g., Nnv. REv. STAT. H9
128.110, 128.120 (1975).
44. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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quires the state to act in ways that have minimal impact on important
rights 4 5
Throughout its history, the test has been referred to by several
labels. The term used herein was defined in Shelton v. Tucker:
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgement must be viewed in the light of the least drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose.40
Recent cases have applied the same rationale under an over-
breadth analysis.17  Although these cases involve first amendment
rights, they make clear that the justification for striking down the stat-
utes involved was the same as that used in Shelton. Under an over-
breadth analysis, statutes which prohibit or restrict expression that can
be legitimately prohibited or restricted are declared unconstitutional if
they also include other expressions that can not be justifiably restricted
in their ambit.48 Thus, as in the application of the lesser restrictive
alternatives doctrine, the focus of the Court's review is the means used
by states to achieve their legitimate goals.
In similar cases state statutes resting on irrebuttable presumptions
have been struck down. Under this approach state statutes which base
infringement of important rights on presumptions which deny individ-
uals an opportunity to show that such infringement does not further the
statute's legitimate goals are struck down.49 As before, the state's
goals are not impermissible; instead, the procedural and substantive
means used to achieve them too greatly burden the right involved.5
45. Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical
Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1108, 1111 (1972); Wormuth
& Mirkin, The Doctrine of Reasonable Alternatives, 9 UTAH L. RF-v. 245 (1964); Note,
The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Overbreadth Doctrine].
46. 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnotes omitted).
47. E.g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258 (1967); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). But see Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
48. Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 45.
49. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441 (1973).
50. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
[S]ince Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in allocating the
rates for tuition and fees in its university system, it is forbidden by the Due
Process Clause to deny an individual the resident rates on the basis of a perma-
nent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence, when that presumption is
not necessary or universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable
8
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The very nature of the requirement of lesser restrictive alterna-
tives assumes that a reasonable alternative to the presently burdensome
state action exists. For this reason the requirement of lesser restrictive
alternatives does not excessively frustrate the legitimate goals of the
state. Because frustation of state goals is minimal, courts appear to
be disposed to apply the test in a greater number of situations than
other constitutional requirements.51 In contrast to their hesitancy to
require the showing of a compelling state interest to justify the infringe-
ment of a fundamental right, courts have required lesser restrictive
alternatives in order to minimize the infringement of a wide range of
rights, which have included economic, 52 as well as non-economic inter-
ests. 53 Thus, lesser restrictive alternatives should be required in ter-
mination and custody proceedings if the parental right can be shown
to be important.
While the parental right is not mentioned in the Constitution and
the Supreme Court has not yet held that the right is fundamental, the
nature of the right itself and Supreme Court cases dealing with closely
related rights suggest that it is entitled to constitutional protection. In
Roe v. Wade,5" the Supreme Court defined fundamental rights as those
rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."5 5 In view of the
alternative means of making the crucial determination. Rather, standards of
due process require that the State allow such an individual the opportunity
to present evidence showing that he is a bona fide resident entitled to the
in-state rates.
Id. at 452 (emphasis added). Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508
(1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (food stamp classification based on a "conclusive pre-
sumption" rather than "individualized determination" invalid when "Congress has al-
ternative means available to it by which its purpose can be achieved.") (emphasis
added).
51. See Comment, Irrebutable Presumptions as an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny
From Rodreguez to LaFleur, 62 GEo. L.J. (1974).
52. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Railroad Co.
v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1878).
53. The following non-economic interests have been protected through a lesser re-
strictive alternative analysis. Freedom of Religion: Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1951); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cantrell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 304 (1940) ("the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining
a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom [of religion]"). Freedom
of Expression: Baird v. State Bar, 410 U.S. 1 (1971); Law Students Research Council
v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1959); Saia
v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1958). Right to Travel: Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1964). Right to Vote: O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524
(1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89
(1965). Right to Procreate: Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55. Id. at 152.
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solicitude given a parent's right to control his child throughout the
history of western civilization, particularly in England and the United
States, it seems clear that the parental right is implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.5 6
This conclusion is further supported by recent Supreme Court
cases which have protected rights related to marriage and the family.
These fights have included the right of women to use contraceptives
57
and to have abortions.5" Both of these cases can be seen as protecting
an individual's right to determine the type of family he will have. 9
Also, the right of an expectant mother to continue teaching has been
protected, 60 thus allowing an individual to have a family without pen-
alty.
These cases protect the family primarily in the context of state
sanctioned marriages, and thus might suggest that an independent par-
ental right has not been recognized. However, the recent case of Stan-
ley v. Illinois61 rebuts this inference and suggests the importance of
the family apart from marriage. In Stanley, an Illinois statute that
created an irrebutable presumption that unmarried fathers were unfit
parents of minor children was struck down. The Supreme Court rea-
soned that the presumption unjustifiably interfered with the father's
parental right because it gave him no opportunity to show that the pre-
sumption was unwarranted in his particular case.62  Thus, even though
Stanley did not label the parental right fundamental, it established that
it is an important right deserving constitutional protection. Further,
Stanley demonstrates that because the parental right is important, the
due process clause requires that the state protect the interests of chil-
dren by means that interfere with the right as little as possible.13
56. See note 10 supra.
57. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
58. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
59. See note 57 supra.
60. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
61. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
62. The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and
raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companion-
ship, care, custody, and management of his or her children "come[s] to this
Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties
which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements."
Id. at 651, quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring).
63. See Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 24 (S.D. Iowa 1975). Cf.
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (lesser restrictive alternatives required
in civil commitment of the mentally ill); Lessard v. Schmidt, 347 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.
Wis. 1972) (lesser restrictive alternatives required in civil commitment of the mentally
ill), vacated and rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
1977]
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LESSER .ESTRICrIVE ALTERNATIVES TO THE
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The parent's right to control his child is an important, if not funda-
mental right. As a result, the state can only protect the interests of
neglected children and of society through means that affect the right
as little as possible. In light of this limitation, how can the competing
interests of the state and the parent be balanced?
State action in cases of parental neglect must be designed to avoid
two extremes. One extreme is the state's abdication of its right to pro-
tect neglected children under the police power and the parens patriae
power. As a practical matter, such a statute would reinstate the early
common law view that the child is the absolute property of the parent.6 4
Although not violative of the lesser restrictive alternative doctrine, such
an extreme would ignore the rights of children and contradict modem
conceptions of public policy.
Despite these problems, two jurisdictions make no provision for
terminating the parental right in cases in'which a child has been neg-
lected.65 To a lesser extent, seven states abdicate responsibility for the
child's best interests by not providing for the transfer of legal custody
of the child between the neglect hearing and the termination disposi-
tion. 66 While courts may terminate or transfer custody in the absence
of a statutory provision, lack of statutory authorization clearly makes
both actions more difficult.
At the other extreme, states could irrebuttably presume that once
a child had been found neglected a parent could never provide proper
care for his child. As indicated by Stanley, such a statute would clearly
violate the lesser restrictive alternative doctrine. Even so, more than
twenty states come dangerously close to this extreme by failing to re-
quire that questions of immediate custody and termination be decided
in two separate proceedings. 67  Such a system completely ignores the
64. See note 10 supra.
65. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.11 (West Supp. 1977); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 42-
807 to 42-818 (Supp. 1975).
66. LA. Cv. CODE ANN. arts. 13:1600-13:1605 (West Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 22-2-23 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-7-7 (Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE § 15-1095-36 (Supp. 1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 26-8-36 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-246 (Supp. 1976).
67. E.g., MD. Soc. SERV. CODE ANN. § 35A (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.090
(1975). Contra, OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130 (Supp. 1976) (finding that child has
been neglected required before state can begin termination proceedings). See generally
Katz, Howe & McGrath, supra note 22, at 67.
[Vol. 12:528
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possibility that once the parent is made aware of the improper condi-
tions he will be able to correct them; the assumption has no support
in each individual case.
Any satisfactory solution must avoid both extremes; it must per-
mit the state to interfere with the parental right and, at the same time,
insure that such interference occurs only when necessary. As has been
suggested, this second requirement has not been fulfilled in the ap-
plication of modem termination statutes. Rather than acting so that
the particular conditions of each family are considered, termination pro-
ceedings tend to treat all family situations alike; serious cases of par-
ental neglect and abuse are not distinguished from those that do not
justify state intervention. Termination is sought in cases in which the
child and society could be adequately protected through short-term re-
moval of custody or the rehabilitation of the parent. This failure to
restrict the parental right only insofar as is necessary is caused by three
factors.
The first factor is fhe breadth of the statutory definitions of neg-
lect. Such definitions bring more persons into the termination process
than is justified in light of the purpose of the statutes. 68 These num-
bers make individual consideration and rehabilitation difficult. More-
over, attainment of these goals is not encouraged by the comparative
costs of maintaining a neglected child at a state institution or treatment
of the parents, and the costs to the state of terminating the rights of
the natural parents in the child and putting him up for adoption.6 9 Be-
cause the costs of termination are far less than those in rehabilitation,
courts tend to resolve doubtful cases in favor of termination.7" This
tendency is not checked because of the last two factors: the absence
of authority to dispose of neglectful parents other than by terminating
their rights in the child, and the absence of procedural safeguards
which insure that termination only occurs when justified. How each
of these factors, which contribute to wholesale termination, should be
constitutionally corrected is the subject of the next three sections.
Defining Neglect
Many of the problems caused by current statutes could be avoided
68. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
69. For example, in 1972 it cost New York State a total of $122,500 to rear a
child until age eighteen, compared to $25,560 for raising the same child as part of
a normal family in foster care. D. FARSEL & E. SHINN, DOLLARS AND SENSE IN FOSTER
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if the purposes of termination were clearer. Besides providing a logi-
cal basis for judicial action, a purpose clause would put the public on
notice of the consequences of mistreatment of children. More import-
antly, in light of the modern tendency to terminate, termination statutes
may be constitutional only if that tendency is counterbalanced by the
recognition of family unity as a purpose of the statute along with pro-
tecting the best interests of the child.71  Such an amended purpose
clause would temper every provision of the statute and would clearly
indicate an intention to terminate parental rights only as a last resort.
More specifically, the cases in which termination is justified should
be enumerated. Even though precision may be inherently elusive,7 2
neglect statutes should also attempt to distinguish various situations in
which a child is found neglected but where dispositions other than ter-
mination are appropriate. Thus, conditions in which a child is not in
immediate danger and when rehabilitation of the parents is possible are
both factors that should be heavily emphasized in determining the ap-
propriate disposition of children found to be neglected.
71. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Inde-
terminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 226 (Summer 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Mnookin]. Aside from Alabama and Texas, which have no purpose clauses, thu pur-
pose of most state statutes is declared to be the protection of the best interests of the
child and the public at large. Oklahoma's purpose clause is illustrative: "This Actrs]
... . purpose [is] . . . : That the care and custody and discipline of the child shall
approximate, as nearly as may be, that which should be given by its parents, and that,
as far as practicable, any delinquent child shall not be treated as a criminal." OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, § 1129 (1971).
A small minority of states include the encouragement of family unity as one
of its goals or characterize termination as a drastic step, to be used only as a last
resort. An example of one such purpose clause, which minimizes infringement of the
parental right, is that of Colorado:
The general assembly declares that the purposes of this title are:(a) To secure for each child subject to these provisions such care and
guidance, preferably in his own home, as will best serve his welfare and the
interests of society;(b) To preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible, including
improvement of home environment;
(c) To remove a child from the custody of his parents only when his
welfare and safety or the protection of the public would otherwise be endan-
gered; and
(d) To secure for any child removed from the custody of his parents
the necessary care, guidance, and discipline to assist him in becoming a respon-
sible and productive member of society.
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102 (1973). See also IDAHO CODE § 16-2001 (Supp. 1976).
See generally Katz, Howe & McGrath, supra note 22.
72. See Mnookin, supra note 71, at 258: "[Ejven where a judge has substantial
information about a child's past home life and the present alterations, present day knowl-
edge about human behavior provides no basis for the kind of individualized predictions
required by the best interests standard." See also, Freud, Child Observation and Pre-
diction of Development-A Memorial Lecture in Honor of Ernst Kris, 13 Tnu Psy-
CHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THm CHmD 92, 97-98 (1958).
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Alternative Dispositions
Assurance that termination occurs only when necessary could also
be increased by specifically stating the alternatives other than termina-
tion that are available following a finding of neglect. Presently such
alternatives which interfere with the parental right less than termination
are not enumerated by the statutes.73 In the absence of authorization,
courts are reluctant to forge lesser restrictive protections of the child.74
Thus, to diminish infringement of the parental right, statutes should
specifically state that a court may, based on appropriate findings, au-
thorize temporary removal of custody for the child until certain condi-
tions are met or permit the rehabilitation of the parents while the child
remains in their custody.
Procedural Safeguards
To insure that the parental right is terminated only when required
by the redrafted statute, both custody and termination hearings should
be made adversarial6.7  In the absence of such a modification of ter-
mination procedures, the integrity of the fact finding process is com-
promised as a result of the state's economic interest in the proceeding.
Such a change would require, among other things, recognition that the
state's protection of the child under the parens patriae doctrine does
not justify suspension of procedural rights recognized in other con-
texts,7 7 such as the right to counsel. Without the presence of counsel,
both the substantive and procedural protections of the statute may be
easily undermined. 78 Similarly, evidentiary rules, jury trial and a right
to appeal should be recognized as well.79  In fact, the importance of
the parental right suggests that greater safeguards should be required
in neglect proceedings than in civil cases, including a more stringent
burden of proof.
73. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
74. See, e.g., Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 24 n.19 (S.D. Iowa),
rev'd in part, 518 F.2d 1160 (8th Cir. 1975).
75. See Roe v. Coma, 417 F. Supp. 769, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
76. Id. at 778.
77. Cf. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. App. 1973) (parens patriae power insuf-
ficient to justify civil commitment on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (requirements of due process
not compromised in civil commitment proceeding under parens patridae power), vacated
and rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
78. See In re Simeth, 40 Cal. App. 3d 982, 115 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1974).
79. Cf. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (normal eviden-
tiary rules, right to jury trial and appeal required in civil commitment proceedings),
vacated and rcv'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
1977]
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A stricter burden of proof is justified in neglect proceedings both
because an important right is involved and because definitions of ter-
minable neglect are inherently vague. Because precedent is of little
value, adequate protection of the parental right requires that the de-
cisionmakers be well convinced of the appropriateness of termination.8"
A stricter burden of proof is particularly justified in termination hear-
ings.81  In termination hearings, the state's interest in protecting the
child is substantially lessened because the child is out of the parents'
custody. On the other hand, the potential for infringement of the par-
ents' rights has increased.
Not only should the state compensate for its tendency to terminate
by improving the fact finding process, it should also permit a parent
to correct the conditions justifying a finding of neglect. One way to
provide this opportunity is by informing the parents of the specific con-
ditions that were the basis of the finding of neglect. 82 Surprisingly,
80. See In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 9 (Ct. App. 1976)(clear and convincing standard required in custody proceeding). Contra, In re J.R.,
386 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1976).
Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (despite justification under the parens
patriae power, incarceration under juvenile delinquency law must be justified by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974)
(clear and convincing proof required for civil commitment).
Because the stigmatization and loss of liberty attendant upon forced con-
finement are of the most profound consequence to the individual affected, due
process demands that he be subjected to such disabilities only if the necessity
for his commitment is proved by evidence having the highest degree of certi-
tude reasonably attainable in view of the nature of the matter at issue. In
a civil commitment proceeding, the questions involved are the primarily sub-jective ones of the subject's mental condition and -the likelihood that he will
be dangerous in the future. Such subjective determinations cannot ordinarily
be made with the same degree of certainty that might be achieved where purely
objective facts and occurrences are at issue. Consequently, the trier of fact
nust be persuaded by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the
subject of the hearing is in need of confinement under the minimum standards
for commitment ....
Id. at 393 (emphasis added). The Lynch court's argument is especially compelling
in the context of the termination of parental rights when considered along with a study
in which three experienced juvenile court judges were given files concerning fifty actual
families and asked if the parents' rights in their children should be terminated. In
that study the judges agreed in less than one-half of the cases, and "[elven in cases
in which they agreed on the decision, the judges did not identify the same factors
as determinants, each seeming to rate to some extent within his own unique value sys-
tem." Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 Hv. E. RaV. 620 (1973).
81. See In re S., 552 P.2d 584 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (Schwab, ChJ., specially con-
curring) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be required in termination hearing).
82. mhe person whose freedom is subjected to a particular control is entitled
to a responsive answer from the sovereign (as a matter of what I call "struc-
tural due process") when he asks why the control has been imposed, just as
he is entitled to be told (as a matter of procedural due process) why the
15
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states rarely require the finding of neglect to be explained and rarely
tell the parents what they must do to correct the situation. 8
Secondly, in order to make this information meaningful, custody
and neglect hearings should be separated by a time period, specified
in the custody order. Without two proceedings that are effectively
separated, the state's interference with the parental right is not suffi-
ciently minimized. In all probability, the state has protected both the
child and the public through the custody hearing; if the child has been
found neglected he will have been removed from the harmful situation.
Termination will probably not further protect either the child or the
state, and in fact may even harm both.-4 Thus, the state has little to
gain through termination, except financial benefit, while the parents
have much to lose. If the parents are given time to correct the condi-
tions termed neglectful, and they do so, then the interests of the state,
the parents and the child have all been served.
Unlike the present statutes which provide for separate proceed-
ings, no absolute time limit should be set in which the termination hear-
ing must be held. The time between custody and termination hearings
should be that period reasonably necessary to correct the conditions
found neglectful. For the opportunity to correct conditions amounting
to neglect to be meaningful, the state should provide social workers to
aid in correcting the problems found at the custody hearing. Other
help should be provided to evaluate the aid given and the progress
made.
CONCLUSION
Although not absolute, the parental right is clearly central to our
social structure. However, laws designed to protect neglected and
abused children often interfere with this right excessively in cases
where the child could be protected through means less drastic than ter-
control applies to him.
Tribe, Three Linked Riddles, 39 lAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 8, 23 (Summer 1975).
83. See Katz, Howe & McGrath, supra note 22, at 61-63. But see IowA CODE
ANN. § 600A.9(c) (West Supp. 1976).
84. See Juvenile Dep't v. Wade, 19 ORE. App. 314, -, 527 P.2d 753, 763 (1974);
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FnAuND, A. SOLN1T, BEYOND THE BEsr INTEREM OF THE CHILD
(1973). Kay & Phillips, Poverty and the Law of Child Custody, 54 CAL. L. REv.
17 (1966); Tamalia, Neglect Proceedings and the Conflict Between Law and Social
Work, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 579, 588 (1971).
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mination. As a result, termination laws appear to be unconstitutional
in light of the lesser restrictive alternatives doctrine. In order to cor-
rect this problem, termination statutes should be modified to make the
process responsive to the particular needs of the parents, the child and
society in each case.
Douglas A. Chaikin
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